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Abstract
In this paper the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of
coordination failures. This is achieved by considering a standard general equilibrium model
and splitting the set of commodities in two groups. The first group contains commodities
like gold. The prices of these commodities are fully flexible, even in the short run, and
their markets always clear. The prices of the commodities in the second group are rigid
in the short run (for instance labour services or some consumer goods) and households
and firms may expect restricted supply possibilities. We show that such expectations are
self-enforcing, even if all prices of commodities in the second group are competitive. In
that case it is shown that as a result of coordination failures a continuum of equilibria
results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade in the commodities of
the second group, and a Walrasian equilibrium. In fact, these coordination failures also
arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price
system and coordination failures. Moreover, some properties of the set of equilibria are
analysed. Generically, there exists a continuum of non-indifferent equilibrium allocations.
Under a condition implied by gross substitutability, there exists a continuum of equilibrium
allocations in the neighbourhood of a competitive allocation. Examples show that the latter
property may not hold in general.
JEL classification: C62, D51
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The standard explanation for underutilisation of resources given by general equilibrium
theory is that relative prices are wrong. For instance, if wages are too high, this may
lead to an excess supply of labour, and consequently to unemployment. This, in turn,
may lead to a lower total income of workers and a lower total demand for commodities.
Consequently, also firms may face restricted possibilities for sales and underutilisation of
resources. Seminal work that generalizes these lines of thought has been done in Bénassy
(1975), Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975). For a recent survey of this work, see Bénassy
(1993).
More recently, another explanation for the underutilisation of resources has been given
in a game-theoretic framework by Roberts (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b). He considers a
game that has several stages corresponding to the choice of prices and wages by firms and
workers, the supply of labour and the demand for commodities by workers, and the actual
hiring and production by firms. If firms expect that the total demand for their output is
low, then they will hire only a limited amount of labour. This will have a negative impact
on income of workers and thereby indeed lead to a low demand for outputs. Workers,
expecting to be (partially) unemployed, supply limited amounts of labour and express low
demands for commodities. In the work of Roberts it is shown that such expectations can
be rational, even at Walrasian prices, and equilibria range from zero employment and zero
output to the Walrasian equilibrium1.
Results similar to those of Roberts date back even earlier. In the framework of a
generalized game Heller and Starr (1979) obtain a continuum of myopic complete infor-
mation equilibria ranging from an equilibrium with zero employment and zero output to
the Walrasian equilibrium. In their generalized game prices are a priori given, and should
be competitive for the result mentioned. There is only one stage where both firms and
households make offers to buy and to sell simultaneously in all markets. The intuitions
and even the conditions required, homothetic preferences and constant returns to scale
production, are closely related to those in the models of Roberts.
In this paper it is shown that these results hold quite generally. Commodities are sep-
arated into two groups. The first group contains commodities like gold (or in a financial
setting bonds or stocks) for which the price is fully flexible and therefore rationing cannot
occur, even in the short run. The second group contains commodities like labour ser-
vices that have rigid prices in the short run. Therefore, households and firms may expect
restricted supply possibilities of these commodities due to coordination failures.
We will show that even if one takes the prices of the commodities in the second group e-
1On the other hand, Jones and Manuelli (1992) find that the results of Roberts are not robust against
small changes in the formulation of the game.
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qual to competitive values, there exists a continuum of underemployment equilibria, among
which an equilibrium with approximately no trade in the markets for the group II com-
modities and a full employment equilibrium. The equilibrium with approximately no trade
in the markets for the group II commodities is called an approximate no-trade equilibrium.
This is somewhat misleading, since in general there is trade in the group I commodities.
All unemployment resulting in the underemployment equilibria may be viewed as a result
of coordination failures since the relative prices of the group II commodities are right, and
the prices of the group I commodities are completely flexible. This makes the case where
the fixed prices are competitive the most pure and illustrative case. Therefore, this case
will be analysed in more detail.
A robust example with an empty set of group I commodities is constructed where the
Walrasian equilibrium price system is unique, while at Walrasian prices there are only t-
wo different underemployment equilibrium allocations, the no-trade equilibrium allocation
and the Walrasian equilibrium allocation. Although, there is still a continuum of underem-
ployment equilibria in that example, i.e. a continuum of expectations, almost all of these
equilibria lead to the same equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the question is addressed,
given competitive prices for the group II commodities, whether in general one may expect
a continuum of underemployment equilibrium allocations and, furthermore, whether there
is a connected subset of the set of underemployment equilibria containing both an approx-
imate no-trade equilibrium and a Walrasian equilibrium. Such a result would imply the
existence of a continuum of allocations in a neighbourhood of the competitive allocation.
The example makes clear that the latter property cannot be true in general. However,
in the most interesting case where the set of group I commodities is non-empty it can be
shown that generically in the initial endowments there is a continuum of underemploy-
ment equilibrium allocations, while for the case with an empty set of group I commodities
a very weak condition guarantees this. Under somewhat stronger conditions it can al-
so be guaranteed that a Walrasian equilibrium is connected to an approximate no-trade
equilibrium.
2 The Model
For m ∈ IN, IRm+ is the non-negative orthant of IR
m, and IRm++ is the strictly positive orthant
of IRm. Vector inequalities will be denoted by ≤, <, , ≥, >, and  .
An economy is denoted by E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H, (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , p̃II, α, β). There
are H households, indexed by h ∈ H, F firms, indexed by f ∈ F, and L commodities,
indexed by l ∈ L.2 Every household h has a consumption set Xh, a preference relation
2The use of H, F, and L for the number and the set of households, firms and commodities, respectively,
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h on Xh, and an initial endowment eh ∈ IRL. The Cartesian product of the sets Xh is
denoted by X̃, so X̃ =
∏
h∈H X
h. Every firm f has a production possibility set Y f . The
set of total production possibilities,
∑
f∈F Y
f , is denoted by Y. The Cartesian product of
the production possibility sets is denoted by Ỹ , so Ỹ =
∏
f∈F Y
f . Household h receives a
share θfh of the profits of firm f.
The commodities are split into two groups, labeled I and II. Whenever such a label is
attached to a symbol, it is meant to refer to the group of commodities indicated by the
label. For instance, LI will denote the number and the set of group I commodities. Without
loss of generality, group I consists of the first LI commodities. The prices of commodities in
group I are assumed to be completely flexible, even in the short run. The markets for these
commodities are organized in such a way that prices will immediately react to small changes
in supply or demand. Examples are auctions (as for fish) or organized (commodity or stock)
exchanges. The markets for these commodities are therefore never cleared by rationing in
an equilibrium. The prices of commodities in group II on the contrary are fixed in the
short run. Like many markets in the real world, small changes in supply or demand are
not immediately reflected by a change in the price. Hence there is scope for rationing in the
markets for these commodities, and agents in the economy may indeed expect rationing to
occur in these markets. The prices of the commodities in group II are given by p̃II ∈ IRL
II
++.




l = 1. Nothing precludes to take for p̃
II the
values corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium price system, if such a price system exists.
If group I is empty, then all prices are fixed in the short run. This is the case often studied
in the fixed-price literature. Still, for many commodities, such an assumption seems too
strong even in the short run. Therefore, we are mainly interested in the case where group I
is non-empty. We will assume that group II is non-empty, since otherwise we are back in
the standard competitive framework.
In general the total demand might not be equal to the total supply of commodities in
group II at price system p̃II, so households and firms may expect restrictions concerning
their net demand or their net supply, following the lines of thought of the seminal contri-
butions of Bénassy (1975), Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975). Both for households and for
firms, restrictions on supply seem to occur much more frequently in western economies as
has also been remarked by van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982). Many households are
restricted in their supply of labour and many firms in their supply of outputs. Therefore,
in this paper attention will be restricted to cases with rationing on the supply side of
households and firms, while the demand side will never be rationed.
In the case of excess supplies, one needs a distributional rule to determine the final
allocation that will result. Such a distributional rule is called a rationing system. In this
will not create ambiguities.
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paper we will consider the case where each household and each firm has a fixed predeter-
mined market share, which allows for uniform rationing as a special case. Our existence
results hold a fortiori for more general rationing schemes admitting fixed predetermined
market shares as a special case.
The vector α ∈ IRHL
II
++ determines the market shares of the households (its components
are denoted by αhl ) and the vector β ∈ IR
FLII
++ (with components denoted by β
f
l ) those of
the firms. This rationing system implies that for every commodity l ∈ LII there exists
rl ∈ IR+ such that the supply possibilities for every household h of commodity l are given
by αhl rl and the supply possibilities for every firm f of commodity l are equal to β
f
l rl. We








l = 1. Then α
h
l
is the share of household h and βfl is the share of firm f in the total possible supply of
commodity l. These vectors α and β only determine the supply possibilities of households
and firms. Clearly, a household and a firm are completely free to demand a commodity
and not to make use at all of the supply possibilities. The rationing system is treated like
a black box. In reality these market shares are determined by all kind of factors that we
will ignore in our model like the ability of suppliers to sell their products, the location of
households and firms, or the existing relationships between them.
The expectations of available opportunities for a household h (firm f) on the var-





+ ), called the expected
opportunities for household h (firm f). The vector of expected opportunities (z, y) =
(z1, . . . , zH, y1, . . . yF ) describes the constraints expected in the economy. In equilibrium
the expected opportunities are required to be rational. These expectations should therefore
match the amounts allocated by the rationing system. So, for the case of the rationing
system with market shares, the set of all expected opportunities that are relevant is given
by the LII-dimensional set ZY , where
ZY =
{



















Firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. For every firm f, given expected opportu-
nities yf ∈ IRL
II
+ , the set of feasible production plans, s
f (yf ), is defined by
sf(yf ) =
{
yf ∈ Y f
∣∣∣yf,II ≤ yf } .
Similarly, for every firm f, given a price system p ∈ IRL and expected opportunities yf ∈
IRL
II
+ , the set of production plans maximizing profit, η
f(p, yf ), is defined by
ηf (p, yf) =
{
ŷf ∈ sf (yf )
∣∣∣p · ŷf ≥ p · yf , ∀yf ∈ sf(yf )} .
If the set ηf (p, yf) is non-empty, then the profit of firm f is defined by πf(p, yf ) = p · yf ,
for yf ∈ ηf(p, yf ). If the set ηf(p, yf ) is non-empty for every firm f, then the wealth of a
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household h, wh, is determined by the value of its initial endowments and the shares in
the profits of the firms, wh = p · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhπf(p, yf ). The budget set of a household
h facing a price system p ∈ IRL, having expected opportunities zh ∈ −IRL
II
+ , and having
wealth wh ≥ p · eh is denoted by γh(p, zh, wh), so
γh(p, zh, wh) =
{
xh ∈ Xh
∣∣∣p · xh ≤ wh and xh,II − eh,II ≥ zh} ,
and its demand set δh(p, zh, wh) is defined by
δh(p, zh, wh) =
{
xh ∈ γh(p, zh, wh)
∣∣∣xh h xh, ∀xh ∈ γh(p, zh, wh)} .
The total excess demand in the economy, given p ∈ IRL and expected opportunities (z, y) ∈
ZY , is defined by
ζ(p, z, y) =
∑
h∈H









ηf (p, yf ).
We are now in a position to give a definition of an underemployment equilibrium. This
definition is also used in Drèze (1997).
Definition 2.1 (Underemployment equilibrium)
An underemployment equilibrium of the economy E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H, (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F ,
p̃II, α, β) is an element (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ IRL × X̃ × Ỹ × ZY satisfying















4. p∗II = p̃II.
The set of all underemployment equilibria of an economy E is denoted by E. Notice that
the definition of an underemployment equilibrium implies that the expected opportunities
(z∗, y∗) belong to ZY . The expectations match the amounts determined by the rationing
system.
The notion of Walrasian equilibrium fits easily in our framework. This is important
since in many of our results we will be focussing on the possibility of coordination failures,
and therefore non-Walrasian equilibria, at Walrasian prices.
Definition 2.2 (Walrasian equilibrium)
An underemployment equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ IRL × X̃ × Ỹ × ZY of the economy
E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H, (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , p̃II, α, β) is a Walrasian equilibrium if
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1. for every household h ∈ H, z∗h < x∗h − eh,
2. for every firm f ∈ F, y∗f < y∗f .
Since preference relations will be assumed convex, the definition of Walrasian equilibrium
coincides with the usual one.
Consider two underemployment equilibria (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗), (p̂∗, x̂∗, ŷ∗, ẑ∗, ŷ∗) of an e-
conomy E. These two underemployment equilibria are said to be potentially different if
x∗ 6= x̂∗ or if the different expectations of available opportunities lead to different sets
of possible choices for at least one household, so if there exists a household h such that
γh(p∗, z∗h, p∗ · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhp∗ · y∗f ) 6= γh(p̂∗, ẑ∗h, p̂∗ · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhp̂∗ · ŷ∗f). This seems to
be the weakest reasonable definition of potentially different underemployment equilibria.
Notice that it might be the case that all households get the same consumption bundle in
two potentially different underemployment equilibria. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable
to make a distinction between two equilibria if the freedom of choice of some household is
different. Notice that z∗ 6= ẑ∗ is not a sufficient condition to get potentially different un-










l , ∀h ∈ H \{h
′},
∀l ∈ L \ {l′}, whereas p∗ = p̂∗, x∗ = x̂∗, and y∗ = ŷ∗, then the two underemployment equi-
libria (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) and (p̂∗, x̂∗, ŷ∗, ẑ∗, ŷ∗) are not potentially different. The fact that
Xh
′





A stronger and more natural criterion for the distinction between two underemploy-
ment equilibria is given by the consideration of the consumption bundles of the households.
The two underemployment equilibria (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) and (p̂∗, x̂∗, ŷ∗, ẑ∗, ŷ∗) are said to be
different if there exists a household h such that x∗h 6= x̂∗h. There is at least one household
receiving a different consumption bundle. The way in which the production of the con-
sumption bundles takes place or the prices against which trade takes place is of no concern
for the notion of different underemployment equilibria. Clearly, two different underemploy-
ment equilibria are also potentially different.
A stronger criterion for the distinction between two underemployment equilibria is
given by the consideration of the utility tuples of the households. Two underemployment
equilibria (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) and (p̂∗, x̂∗, ŷ∗, ẑ∗, ŷ∗) are said to be strongly different if there
exists a household h such that x∗h h x̂∗h or x̂∗h h x∗h. Notice that two strongly different
underemployment equilibria are also different.
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3 Existence of a Continuum of Underemployment E-
quilibria
3.1 Assumptions
In this section we show the existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria. We
will make use of the following assumptions with respect to the economy E.
A1. For every household h ∈ H, the consumption set Xh is non-empty, closed, convex,
and Xh ⊆ IRL+.
A2. For every household h ∈ H, the preference relation h is complete, transitive, contin-
uous, convex, and for every xh ∈ Xh there exists x̂h ∈ Xh such that xh,II = x̂h,II and
xh ≺h x̂h, and there exists x̃h ∈ Xh such that xh,I = x̃h,I, xh,II < x̃h,II, and xh ≺h x̃h.
A3. For every household h ∈ H, there is xh ∈ Xh such that xh,I  eh,I and xh,II = eh,II,







∀l ∈ LII \ {l′}.
A4. For every firm f ∈ F, the production possibility set Y f is closed, convex, −IRL+ ⊆ Y
f ,
θfh ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H, and
∑
h∈H θ
fh = 1. Moreover, Y ∩−Y ⊆ {0}.









++ , and β ∈ IR
FLII
++ .
A6. For every household h ∈ H, the consumption set Xh = IRL+, the preference relation
h can be represented by a utility function uh, where uh is twice differentiable on
IRL++, ∂u
h  0, ∂2uh is negative definite on (∂uh)⊥,3 and uh(eh) ≥ uh(xh), for every
xh ∈ IRL+ \ IR
L
++. For every firm f ∈ F, the production possibility set is described
by a twice continuously differentiable function gf : IRL → IR, so Y f = {yf ∈ Y f |
gf (yf) ≤ 0}, and for any yf on the production frontier {yf ∈ Y f | gf (yf) = 0} it
holds that ∂2gf is positive definite on (∂gf)⊥.
A7. The economy E has a well-defined aggregate excess demand function z : IRL++ ×
ZY → IRL. If (p′,−z′, y′) ≤ (p,−z, y) with p′l′ = pl′ , z
′






zl′(p′, z′, y′) ≤ zl′(p, z, y).4
The often made assumption in the fixed-price literature that Xh = IRL+ or that X
h + IRL+ ⊆
Xh is replaced by the weaker assumption A1. Examples where the usual assumptions
3“⊥” denotes the orthogonal complement.







are not satisfied but ours are, concern group II commodities for which there is a clear
physical upper bound on consumption in a given time interval, or commodities that can
only be consumed together with a sufficient amount of another commodity. For instance,
consumption at a remote place can only take place together with certain transportation
services or some services cannot be supplied without sufficient education. Assumption A2
implies that there is non-satiation with respect to the group I commodities and with respect
to the group II commodities, a much weaker requirement than monotonicity of preferences.
A preference relation h is said to be convex if xh, x̂h ∈ Xh and xh ≺h x̂h implies
xh ≺h λxh + (1− λ)x̂h, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1).
The somewhat clumsy statement of Assumptions A2 and A3 guarantees that for the
case LII = 0 we make the same assumptions as Debreu (1959). For the case LII ≥ 1,
our assumptions coincide with those of Debreu for an economy consisting of the first LI
commodities.
Assumption A6, which will be needed for part of the results, states the standard dif-
ferentiability requirements on the primitive concepts, see for instance Mas-Colell (1985).
In addition to these primitive assumptions about individual agents, we shall need for our
strongest result (Theorem 3.1.iii) an assumption akin to gross substitution. The assumption
used in our proof of that result is a weaker form of the more intuitive Assumption A7. In
the case of exchange economies, A7 could be stated for individual demands and would
be preserved under aggregation. For this case Movshovich (1994) gives assumptions on
primitive concepts implying a stronger form of A7. When individual incomes include
profits, a lucid statement is only possible in terms of aggregate demand.
Assumption A7 states that the net demand for any one good does not increase when the
prices and/or supply possibilities of other commodities are decreased. It is not required that
the net demand for the other commodities increases. Actually, we only use that assumption
starting from a competitive equilibrium, and still in weaker form. But we are unable to
illustrate meaningfully what is gained by the weakening. For instance, the assumptions on
individual primitives required to guarantee gross substitution at a competitive equilibrium
imply gross substitution everywhere.
We could state A7 for correspondences, following Polterovich and Spivak (1983), but
we use it in conjunction with A6, hence for functions, and therefore state it for functions.
3.2 The Existence Theorem
By Debreu (1959), (1) and (2) page 77, it follows that the set of attainable allocations of









f = 0}, is compact.
Let b > 0 be such that ‖(x, y)‖∞ < b, ∀(x, y) ∈ A. Since A is compact, such a b exists,
and since (e, 0) ∈ A it follows that b > maxh∈H,l∈L ehl . Observe that all potentially different
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underemployment equilibria are obtained when attention is restricted to expected oppor-
tunities (z, y) ∈ ZY satisfying, for every l ∈ LII, min{−zhl , y
f
l
| h ∈ H, f ∈ F} ≤ b. The
set of underemployment equilibria sustained by such expectations is denoted by Ê.
The extend to which the market for a commodity l ∈ LII is employed in an underem-








| h ∈ H, f ∈ F}.
If υl = 0, then the market for commodity l has collapsed completely and no supply is
expected to take place. If υl = 1, then no binding constraints on supply are expected
in the market for commodity l. We will need this measure of employment to distinguish
between different underemployment equilibria.
Theorem 3.1
Let E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H , (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , p̃II, α, β) be an economy with H ≥ 2 and
LI ≥ 1.
(i) Under A1-A5, the set of underemployment equilibria Ê owns a component Êc which:
contains a continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria;
includes an underemployment equilibrium with maxl∈LII υl = υ for all υ ∈ (0, 1].
(ii) Under A1-A6, generically in initial endowments, Ê owns a component Êc which:
contains a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria.
(iii) Under A1-A7, if p̃II = p∗II with (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) a Walrasian equilibrium, Ê owns a
component Êc which:
ranges from an approximate no-trade equilibrium at prices p ≤ p∗ to the competitive
equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗).
Proof
See Appendix.
3.3 Interpretation of the Theorem
Theorem 3.1.i states that there is a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging
from an underemployment equilibrium with arbitrarily low trade in the group II commodi-
ties to an equilibrium without rationing in the market for at least one group II commodity.
The markets for the group I commodities are in equilibrium without rationing. This mean-
s that there are many different expectations leading to an underemployment equilibrium,
ranging from the expectations that no household and no firm will supply a positive amount
of any group II commodity, to the expectations that at least in one market for group II
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commodities free trade without rationing is possible. There exists an underemployment
equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ Êc with x∗,II arbitrarily close to eII, and y∗,II, z∗, and y∗ all
arbitrarily close to zero, so with all υl arbitrarily close to zero. Furthermore, there exists
an underemployment equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ Êc where for some l ∈ LII it holds
that no household and no firm faces binding expected opportunities in the market for com-









, ∀f ∈ F, and υl is equal to one. These
two “extreme” equilibria are contained in a connected set of underemployment equilibria
and this connected set contains a continuum of potentially different equilibria. Recall that
two underemployment equilibria are potentially different if at least one household has a
different set of possible choices. We will show by means of Example 4.1 in Section 4 that
it is possible that there is no underemployment equilibrium in the set Ê with υl exactly
equal to 0 for all l.
The notion of potentially different is rather weak, since it is not claimed that potentially
different underemployment equilibria are in fact different. Theorem 3.1.ii makes clear
that generically this is the case. Keeping everything fixed, except initial endowments,
there exists a subset Ω of IRHL++ such that the closure of IR
HL
++ \ Ω in IR
HL
++ has Lebesgue
measure zero, and for every specification of initial endowments (e1, . . . , eH) ∈ Ω, there
is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria. Generically in initial
endowments, there is a continuum of different utilities that households can have in an
underemployment equilibrium, irrespective of the prices of group II commodities being
compatible with competitive values or not. If those prices have competitive values, then
the Walrasian equilibrium is one of the underemployment equilibria. It might however
be that the continuum of allocations is close to the no-trade equilibrium and not to the
competitive equilibrium. This case is dismal from an economic point of view, because
arbitrarily small perturbations away from competitive expectations would then lead to a
severe depression.
Under which circumstances is there a continuum of underemployment allocations near
a competitive allocation? For such a result to be true, it is necessary that p̃II be compatible
with a competitive equilibrium. Theorem 3.1.iii shows that the component of underemploy-
ment equilibria containing an approximate no-trade equilibrium also contains a Walrasian
equilibrium if A7 is invoked. From this it follows by a simple argument that there is an
underemployment equilibrium with minl∈LII υl equal to any υ ∈ (0, 1]. Values of υ close to
one correspond to approximately Walrasian equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 is striking since it even holds in the circumstances that are most favourable
for competitive equilibrium: all prices of group II commodities equal to competitive values
and, in a world with time and uncertainty, all future commodities belong to group I. The
intuition behind Theorem 3.1 is the same as the explanation given in the introduction for
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the results of Roberts. If firms expect that the total demand for output is low, then they
will hire only a limited amount of labour. This has a negative impact on the income of
workers and thereby indeed leads to a low demand for outputs. As Drèze (1997) argues,
this reasoning can be given empirical underpinning. Theorem 3.1 shows that this reasoning
can also be verified formally. For the result to hold one also needs downwards rigidity of
the prices of the group II commodities. Otherwise, excess supplies of group II commodities
could lead to lower prices of these commodities. However, Theorem 3.1 makes clear that
also at those lower prices, there is again scope for coordination failures. It may be difficult
to get out of a situation with coordination failures. All the households and firms together
would have to revise their expectations simultaneously.
Following the arguments of Drèze (1997), Theorem 3.1 has even more important eco-
nomic consequences. For instance, it makes clear that the observation of excess supply is
not sufficient to infer the existence of price and wage distortions. Indeed, Theorem 3.1.i
and 3.1.ii hold for any price system for the group II commodities, whereas the prices of the
group I commodities are completely flexible. When prices or wages are not at competitive
values, their distorting effects can even be magnified by coordination failures as expressed
in Theorem 3.1.i. Because of the multiplicity of underemployment equilibria, the modelling
of dynamics becomes crucial, and history will play an important role. In the presence of
coordination failures, price and wage dynamics might not be very helpful in getting back
to a competitive allocation of resources and can even worsen the situation. For a further
development of these arguments in two macroeconomic models, the Real Business Cycle
model and the Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model, see Drèze (1997).
3.4 The Case Without Group I Commodities
Since much of the fixed-price literature considers the case LI = 0 and this case is probably
the clearest for illustrative purposes, we treat it in somewhat more detail here. The proof
of Theorem 3.1.i will be given for H ≥ 1 and LI ≥ 0. Even if LI = 0 there will be a
continuum of potentially different equilibria. In an economy with only one household and
no production, there are no different underemployment equilibria.
Example 4.2 is a robust example of a Cobb-Douglas economy with H = 2 and LI = 0
such that in every underemployment equilibrium all households keep their initial endow-
ments. By Theorem 3.1.ii such an example cannot be given if LI is greater than or equal
to one. But the example is not fully convincing since the price system considered is rather
extreme. Suppose the prices of the group II commodities are compatible with a Walrasian
equilibrium price system for the entire economy. Is it still possible that all underemploy-
ment equilibria, except the ones corresponding to the Walrasian equilibrium, are utility
equivalent at Walrasian prices? The question will be answered affirmatively by means of
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the robust Example 4.3.
Assume that at every underemployment equilibrium with maxl∈L υl = 1 there is trade
on some of the markets. Since there is a component of the set of underemployment e-
quilibria connecting such an underemployment equilibrium to an approximate no-trade
equilibrium, this implies the existence of a continuum of different underemployment equi-
libria. The weak conditions of Theorem 3.2 are such that trade in some of the markets
occurs at every underemployment equilibrium with maxl∈L υl = 1. By 0−l′ for some l′ ∈ L
we will denote expected opportunities of no supply possibilities in the market for every
commodity in L being different from l′, and no rationing in the market for commodity l′,
so zh = 0−l′ implies that zhl = 0, ∀l ∈ L \ {l
′}, and zhl′ = “ −∞”, and y
f = 0−l′ implies
that yf
l




Let the economy E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H, (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , p̃II, α, β) with LI = 0 satisfy
A1-A5. If, for every l ∈ L, there exists h ∈ H such that eh /∈ δh(p̃II, 0−l, p̃II · eh) or there
exists f ∈ F such that 0 /∈ ηf (p̃II, 0−l), then the set Ê of underemployment equilibria of
E owns a component Êc which contains a continuum of strongly different underemploy-
ment equilibria. It includes an underemployment equilibrium with maxl∈L υl = υ for all
υ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof
See Appendix.
The additional condition we need to have a continuum of strongly different underemploy-
ment equilibria is very weak. Indeed, we require that for every commodity there exists a
household or a firm that is willing to supply it if it expects no restrictions on the supply
of this commodity, but it expects not to have supply possibilities of any other commodity,
whereas the household does not receive any profit income. The assumption means that for
every labour service there is a household willing to supply it, while for every intermediate
product or consumer good there is a firm willing to supply it, under the conditions that
the household expects to be fully restricted in the supply of all other labour services (and
land, etc.) and receives no profit income, while the firm expects to be fully restricted in the
supply of any other output. Requiring this at Walrasian prices would considerably weaken
the assumption, since Walrasian prices are already balanced in some sense. Moreover, that
we only need the assumption in the case households or firms expect to be fully restricted
in the supply of all other commodities is also pleasant, since it means that supplying the
commodity under consideration is the only way to achieve a positive income.
The proof of Theorem 3.1.iii will be given for H ≥ 1 and LI ≥ 0. Even if LI =
0 the underemployment equilibria range from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to a
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competitive equilibrium under A1-A7.
3.5 Relation to the Literature
In the early fixed-price literature, where LI = 0 and there is no rationing in the market for
an a priori numeraire commodity, Silvestre (1980) gives a robust example with a continuum
of equilibria when the fixed price is taken equal to a competitive price. Although the
example is robust, it is also possible to give robust examples with a unique equilibrium.
The continuum of Silvestre is obtained by varying the rationing system. For instance, in
case there is an excess supply in a market and there are two suppliers of the corresponding
commodity, both facing binding rationing, then any distribution of the demand among the
suppliers may yield an equilibrium. Indeed, if in the set-up of the fixed-price literature a
rationing system is specified, then the results of Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) imply
that there is generically a finite number of equilibria and the results of Herings (1996b),
Chapter 11, that there is generically an odd number of equilibria.
For the case LI = 0 and no production, van der Laan (1982) states a result similar
to Theorem 3.1.i, using arguments from combinatorial optimization. Using that approach
such a result was indeed shown to be correct in Herings (1993). For that much simpler
case the result is even true for υ = 0. In Herings (1993) it is shown as well that the
connectedness property a component possesses, is very strong and can be used to generate
all kinds of interesting corollaries.
In Citanna, Crès, and Villanacci (1995) the case LI = 0 without production is consid-
ered. Their main result claims that given a commodity l ∈ L and an amount of employment
υ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a competitive price system p∗ inducing an underemployment equilib-
rium for which υl = υ in an economy with p̃II = p∗. Unfortunately, this result is not correct
as is demonstrated by Example 4.3. Such a result would be true, even with the competitive
price system p∗ fixed in advance, if expectations of restricted demand opportunities are
taken in consideration, see Herings (1996a).
4 Three Examples
In Section 3 it has been promised that we would give an example of an economy without
an underemployment equilibrium at which υl = 0 for all l ∈ LII.
Example 4.1
Consider the economy E = ((IR2+),
1, (1, 1), (Y f , 1), 1, α, β), where 1 is represented by







1 = {y1 ∈ IR2+ | y
1






and LII = 1. The rationing system (α, β) can be chosen arbitrarily (satisfying A5). This
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example satisfies A1-A5. Therefore we know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected
set of underemployment equilibria that contains an underemployment equilibrium with
maxl∈LII υl = υ2 = υ, for all υ ∈ (0, 1]. Solving the firm’s profit maximization problem
yields that for every p1 ∈ IR+, for every y12 ∈ IR+, η
1((p1, 1), y12) = {p1/2,−(p1)
2/4} and
π1((p1, 1), y12) = (p1)
2/4. Since the firm never wants to supply commodity 2, it is never
affected by the opportunities expected in this market.
Let the household be constrained by x12 − 1 ≥ −υ. If it supplies υ to the firm, then
p1 = 2
√
υ is required for profit maximization. At that price, the unconstrained demand of
the household is x1 = (1+
p1
2
)2/(2p1), x2 = (1+
p1
2




, or equivalently υ ≤ 1
9
, in which case the constraint is binding. There is a continuum
of strongly different equilibria for υ ∈ (0, 1
9
] with p1 = 2
√
υ; but there is no equilibrium at
υ = 0, since this would imply p1 = 0 and excess demand of good 1.
If an input vector subject to supply rationing is used to produce an output not subject to
supply rationing and desired by consumers, then technology and tastes should be such that
there exists a relative price for the output at which it is neither supplied nor demanded,
given the prices and expected opportunities for the other goods. It is difficult to formulate
assumptions on primitives that imply such a property, which should be related to the
existence of a finite rate of transformation of inputs into outputs.
The following, robust, example of a Cobb-Douglas economy shows that it is possible
that in every underemployment equilibrium all households keep their initial endowments.
Example 4.2
Consider the economy E = ((IR2+,
h, (1, 1))h∈H , (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , (1/5, 4/5), α, β), where














2, Y f = −IRL+, f ∈ F, so we consider an economy without
production possibilities, or, alternatively, an economy where all production has already
taken place. Furthermore, ((θfh)h∈H)f∈F , α, and β can be chosen arbitrarily (but should
of course satisfy A4 and A5). Notice that A1-A5 are satisfied by this economy, so we
know by Theorem 3.1.i that there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria
ranging from an approximate no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in
at least one market and containing a continuum of potentially different underemployment
equilibria. Let us compute the set of underemployment equilibria directly. If both house-
holds expect no restrictions with respect to the supply of commodity 2, then the optimal
consumption bundle of household 1 is (10/3, 5/12) and the optimal consumption bundle
of household 2 is (5/3, 10/12). This means that both households supply commodity 2 in
exchange for commodity 1. Notice that irrespective of the supply possibilities consumers
expect for both commodities, at the price system (1/5, 4/5) they will supply commodity 2
14
in exchange for commodity 1, unless they expect both to be fully rationed on the supply
of commodity 2. It follows that there is a continuum of underemployment equilibria, given
by (p̃II, e, 0, z∗, y∗) with (z∗, y∗) ∈ ZY , where both households keep the initial endowments,
z∗12 = z
∗2
2 = 0, and z
∗
1 is arbitary. All equilibria are characterized by full rationing of the
supply of commodity 2, υ2 = 0, whereas the expected opportunities for supply of commod-
ity 1 do not really matter. The impossibility of supply of commodity 2 leads to zero net
demand of commodity 1 for both households. Although the expectations with respect to
the market for commodity 1 do not really matter for the equilibrium allocation, there is a
continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria ranging from the expecta-
tions that no supply is possible in the market for commodity 1, υ1 = 0, to the expectations
that there are no supply restrictions in the market for commodity 1, υ1 = 1.
Although the underemployment equilibria in Example 4.2 are potentially different, they
are different in a weak sense. They are not different or strongly different as defined in
Section 2. But the example is not fully convincing since the price system considered is
rather extreme. Example 4.3 shows that it is possible that all underemployment equilibria,
except the ones corresponding to the unique Walrasian equilibrium, are utility equivalent
at Walrasian prices.
Example 4.3
Consider the economy E = ((IR3+,
h, eh)h∈H , (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), α, β), where
LI = 0, the prefence relation of household 3 is represented by the utility function u3 : IR3+ →




3 and its initial endowments are given by e
3 = (c, c, c). For any
price system such that
∑
l∈L pl = 1 it holds that d
3(p) = (c/(3p1), c/(3p2), c/(3p3)). The
preferences of the other households are such that their (unrationed) demand as a function
of the price system is differentiable, and their demands at price system (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) sum
up to their total initial endowments. Then it follows easily that taking c large enough
guarantees that the Walrasian equilibrium price system (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is unique. Notice
that if p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), household 3 wants to keep its initial endowments and is therefore
never affected by expectations concerning the supply possibilities in any of the markets.
The rather artificial household 3 is used only to show that the rather strange phenomena
of the example are not related to the issue of uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium.
Household 3 can be dispensed with entirely if so desired.
Households 1 and 2 have preferences and initial endowments as indicated in Figures
2a and 2b. For those figures it is assumed that p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Using Walras’ law,
the amount of the third commodity can be determined by measuring the distance to the
fourty-five degree line. There is no production, Y f = −IR3+, f ∈ F. The rationing system
is determined by arbitrarily chosen α ∈ IRHL++ and β ∈ IR
FL
++. The example is constructed in
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such a way that A1-A5 are satisfied by this economy. So we know by Theorem 3.1.i that
there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from an approximate
no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in at least one market and con-
taining a continuum of potentially different underemployment equilibria. Moreover, one of





















Figure 2b. Preferences of household 2.
We will again compute the set of underemployment equilibria. For h ∈ H, let dh(zh)














l , ∀l ∈ L.
For this price system there exists a unique Walrasian equilibrium, where the consumption
bundles of households 1 and 2 are indicated by x∗1 and x∗2 in Figures 2a and 2b. In
Figure 2a the demand of household 1 at expected opportunities that are such that the
household is not rationed in the markets for commodities 1 and 2, and expects supply
possibilities z13 in the market for commodity 3, is depicted (d
1(−∞,−∞, z13)). Similarly,
in Figure 2b the demand of household 2 at expected opportunities that are such that the
household is not rationed in the markets for commodities 1 and 3, and supply possibilities
z22 are expected in the market for commodity 2, is depicted (d
2(−∞, z22,−∞)), as well as
the demand of household 2 at expected opportunities that are such that the household
is not rationed in the markets for commodities 2 and 3, and expects supply possibilities
z21 in the market for commodity 1 (d
2(z21,−∞,−∞)). For this example we claim that
there are only two different underemployment equilibria. The first one is given by the
no-trade equilibrium where everyone keeps his initial endowment, and the second one by
the Walrasian equilibrium. The claim will be proved in three steps.
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Step 1. It is shown that there is no underemployment equilibrium close to (but not
equal to) the Walrasian equilibrium. If z13 is in absolute value smaller than but close to











































∗1, so the only way an
underemployment equilibrium may result is that household 2 expects no restrictions with
respect to supply in any market, which yields the Walrasian equilibrium). However, by no
choice of z21 and z
2






































Therefore, there is no underemployment equilibrium being close to the Walrasian equilib-
rium.
Step 2. It is shown that z21 = z
1
3 = 0 yields the no-trade equilibrium, irrespective of the
value of z22. This step is obvious and yields the connected set of underemployment equilibria
ranging from the no-trade equilibrium to an equilibrium without rationing in the market
for commodity 2. However, also in the latter equilibrium there is no trade, although it is
potentially different from the former no-trade equilibrium.
Step 3. It is shown that there is no underemployment equilibrium (p̃II, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗),
where z∗21 6= 0 or z
∗1
3 6= 0, not being equal to the Walrasian equilibrium. Clearly, ei-
ther z∗13 is binding for household 1, or z
∗1
3 is not binding for household 1. In the lat-
ter case, household 1 demands x∗1, which is only compatible with a Walrasian equilib-
rium. Consequently, the only way to obtain an underemployment equilibrium not be-
ing equal to the Walrasian equilibrium is by having a binding z∗13 for household 1. Let
a ∈ −IR+ be such that d11(−∞,−∞, a) = e
1

































3 ) < x
∗1
1 , which leads to a
contradiction as in Step 1. Consequently, z∗13 > a and is binding for household 1. Now, ei-
ther z∗11 is binding for household 1, or z
∗1
1 is non-binding for household 1. In the latter case,
using z∗13 > a, it follows that d
1
1(z
∗1) < e11. However, d
2
1(z
∗2) ≤ e21, a contradiction. Conse-
quently, z∗11 is binding for household 1. If z
∗1
1 < 0, then d
1(z∗1) < e11, leading to a contra-
diction as before. So, z∗11 = 0 and d
1
2(z
∗2) > e12 unless z
∗1
3 = 0. If z
∗1
1 = 0, then z
∗2
1 = 0 and
d22(z
∗2) > e12 unless z
∗2




∗2) = e12 + e
2
2,






3 = 0, which leads to a no-trade equilibrium.
In Example 4.3 the conditions of Theorem 3.2 cannot be satisfied, since there are only two d-
ifferent underemployment equilibria. In this example it holds that δ1(p̃II, 0−2, p̃II·e1) = {e1},
whereas δ2(p̃II, 0−2, p̃II · e2) = {e2}. For this situation to occur it is necessary that house-
hold 2 that is a supplier of commodity 2 at the Walrasian equilibrium, is no longer willing
to supply this commodity if it expects no supply possibilities of commodities 1 and 3.
Also the extension of Theorem 3.1.iii to LI = 0 does not apply. Let us denote the excess
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demand correspondence, which is a function now, by z, and let us surpress the dependence
on p, which is constant, and y, which is redundant. Let (p∗, x∗, z∗) denote the competitive
equilibrium for the economy of Example 4.3. Now consider −z ≤ −z∗ that arises from
keeping z2 at competitive values, and decreasing z1 and z3 away from competitive values.
Since z∗ is non-binding, initially these decrements have no effect, z(z) = 0, and A7 is
satisfied. Without loss of generality, either z1 or z3 becomes binding after a sufficiently large
decrement. In both cases it is easily verified that z2(z) > maxl∈{1,3} zl(z), contradicting
A7 and contradicting also the weaker version of A7 used in the proof. Indeed, limited
expected supply possibilities in the market for commodity 3 lead to a strongly positive
demand for commodity 2 by household 1. The demand for commodity 2 increases even
more than the demand for commodity 3, a strong complementarity. Analogously, limited
expected supply possibilities in the market for commodity 1 lead to a strongly positive
demand for commodity 2 by household 2. Again, the demand for commodity 2 increases
even more than the demand for commodity 1. Theorem 3.1.iii shows that if one rules out
such strong complementarities, then the situation of Example 4.3 does not occur and there
is a continuum of strongly different equilibrium allocations ranging from an approximate
no-trade equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium.
Appendix: Proofs
A first step in the proof is to show that the production possibility correspondences and
budget correspondences are continuous.
We compactify the consumption sets and the production possibility sets using the num-
ber b as defined in Subsection 3.2, so X̂h = {xh ∈ Xh | ‖xh‖∞ ≤ b} and Ŷ f = {yf ∈ Y f |
‖yf‖∞ ≤ b}. It follows from a standard argument that there is no loss of generality in
using the compactified consumption and production sets when studying the existence of
underemployment equilibria. The feasible production plans, supply, budget, and demand
correspondences derived from X̂h and Ŷ h are denoted by ŝf , η̂f , γ̂h, and δ̂h, respectively.
Let us define the set P of prices, expected opportunities, and wealths by
P = {(p, zh, wh) ∈ IRL+ ×−IR
LII
+ × IR | p · e
h ≤ wh, and pI > 0 or pII · zh < 0}.
Lemma A.1




L of firm f is compact-valued, convex-valued and continuous, and the budget




Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness of ŝf are trivial. First we show the upper
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)n∈IN remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has
a converging subsequence, also denoted by (yf
n
)n∈IN, converging to, say, yf ∈ Ŷ f . It has




, it follows that yf ≤ yf . Consequently,
yf ∈ ŝf (yf ) and ŝf is upper hemi-continuous.
Next lower hemi-continuity of the production possibility correspondence is shown. Let
some yf ∈ IRL
II
+ be given, let (y
fn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
LII
+ converging to y
f , and let yf










→ yf . Let the sets L and L be
defined by
L = {l ∈ LII | yfl > 0},
L = {l ∈ LII | yfl ≤ 0}.
For n ∈ IN, let λf
n






















It holds that yf
n












, and for l ∈ L it holds that yf
n
l ≤ 0 ≤ y
fn















= 1. Therefore, it follows that yf
n
→ yf .
Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness of γ̂h are trivial. Let us show upper hemi-





be a sequence in P converging to (p, zh, wh), and let the sequence (xh
n









)n∈IN remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has a
converging subsequence, also denoted by (xh
n
)n∈IN, converging to, say, xh ∈ X̂h. It has to




it follows that p · xh ≤ wh. Since
xh
n,II− eh,II ≥ zh
n
it follows that xh,II− eh,II ≥ zh. Consequently, xh ∈ γ̂h(p, zh, wh) and γ̂h
is upper hemi-continuous.
Finally, lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence is shown. Let some (p, zh, wh) ∈




)n∈IN be a sequence in P converging to (p, z
h, wh), and let xh be
an element of γ̂h(p, zh, wh). The correspondence γ̂h is lower hemi-continuous at (p, zh, wh)
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if there is a sequence (xh
n
)n∈IN in IR









the sets L and L be defined by
L = {l ∈ LII
∣∣∣xhl − ehl < 0},
L = {l ∈ LII
∣∣∣xhl − ehl ≥ 0}.
Now two cases have to be considered, p · xh < wh and p · xh = wh.
Case 1. p · xh < wh. Let x̂h ∈ X̂h be chosen such that x̂h,I ≤ eh,I and x̂h,II = eh,II. For
n ∈ IN, let λh
n























xh + (1− λh
n
)x̂h.
It holds that xh
n
∈ X̂h by convexity of X̂h. Moreover, using that p · xh < wh and pn · x̂h ≤
pn · eh ≤ wh
n
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so it follows that xh
n
→ xh.
Case 2. p · xh = wh. Let x̂h ∈ X̂h be such that x̂h,I  eh,I, and x̂h,II = eh,II. Choose
x̃h ∈ X̂h as follows. If pl′ > 0 for some l
′ ∈ LI, then let x̃h be equal to x̂h. Otherwise,
there is l′′ ∈ LII such that pIIl′′ · z
h,II
l′′ < 0. Then let x̃
h be such that x̃h,I ≤ eh,I, x̃hl′′ = e
h
l′′ − ε




l , ∀l ∈ L
II \ {l′′}. It follows from A3 as well as the convexity
of X̂h, that indeed x̃h can be chosen in the way described above. Notice that p · x̃h < wh




l′′. Clearly, there exists n ∈ IN such that for all n ≥ n, p









l′′. For n ≥ n, let λ
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is given by µh
n
= 1 if pn · (λh
n













)x̂h− x̃h)), otherwise. Notice that µh
n
∈ (0, 1) in the latter case.






), and that λh
n
→ 1 and µh
n
→ 1.
So it follows that xh
n
→ xh and that γ̂h is lower hemi-continuous. Q.E.D.
Lemma A.1 extends the lemma in Drèze (1975), page 304, in several respects. First, we
have included production. Secondly, our assumptions with respect to the consumption
sets, preference relations, and initial endowments are weaker. Thirdly, we cannot limit
ourselves to the case where wh = p · eh, since the possibility of production may lead to
profit income for households. For the same reasons, Theorem 2.2 of Herings (1996a), page
67, is generalized. Lemma A.1 leads to upper hemi-continuity of demand and supply
correspondences and continuity of profit functions.
Lemma A.2




of firm f and the demand correspondence δ̂h : P → IRL of household h are compact-valued,
convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous. The profit function π̂f : IRL × IRL
II
+ → IR of
firm f is continuous.
Proof
This follows from Lemma A.1 and an application of the maximum theorem. Q.E.D.
Some other properties of η̂f and δ̂h are readily seen. For instance the boundary behaviour




l for every x
h ∈ δ̂h(p, zh, wh), and yf
l
= 0 implies yfl ≤ 0 for every
yf ∈ η̂f (p, yf). Using the definition of γ̂h(p, zh, wh), p ·xh ≤ wh for every xh ∈ δ̂h(p, zh, wh).
Now we construct a correspondence ζ̂ such that its zero points correspond to all po-
tentially different underemployment equilibria. Denote the minimal market share in the




l | h ∈ H, f ∈ F}.
Them-dimensional unit cube is given by Qm = {q ∈ IRm | 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,m}. Let
(φ1, φ2) : Q
















where φ1(q) determines the expected opportunities of the households and φ2(q) the ex-
pected opportunities of the firms. So, for l ∈ LII, ql ∈ [0, 1] parametrizes the expected










ql). The expected opportuni-
ties range from (0, 0) if ql = 0, to a vector (z, y) satisfying min{−zhl , y
f
l
| h ∈ H, f ∈ F} = b.
The parameter ql coincides with υl as defined in Subsection 3.2.
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The correspondence ζ̂ : IRL+ ×Q




















is denoted by ζ̂|p̃II. It holds that
ζ̂|p̃II is a compact-valued and convex-valued correspondence that is upper hemi-continuous
everywhere, except at the point ((0, p̃II), 0).
The set of zero points of ζ̂|p̃II is denoted by Ẑ0 = {(p, q) ∈ IR
L
+ × Q
LII | pII = p̃II and
0 ∈ ζ̂(p, q)}. The correspondence ψ̂ : Ẑ0 → IR






















to (p, q) ∈ Ẑ0. Then ψ̂(Ẑ0) is the set of all potentially different underemployment equilibria
of E, ψ̂(Ẑ0) = Ê.
To prove Theorem 3.1.i we will use a fixed point theorem. In fact, Browder’s fixed
point theorem (see Browder (1960)), and the extension of it to correspondences as stated
in Theorem A.3 (see Mas-Colell (1974), Theorem 3, page 230) will be needed in the proof.
Theorem A.3 (Browder’s fixed point theorem)
Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of IRm and let ϕ : S × [0, 1] → S be
a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Then the set
Fϕ = {(s, λ) ∈ S×[0, 1] | s ∈ ϕ(s, λ)} contains a component F cϕ such that (S×{0})∩F
c
ϕ 6= ∅
and (S × {1}) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅.
The m-dimensional unit simplex is denoted by Sm = {s ∈ IRm+1+ |
∑m+1
i=1 si = 1} and,
for ε ≥ 0, the subset of the cube satisfying that each of its elements has at least one
component greater than or equal to ε by Qm(ε) = {q ∈ Qm | ‖q‖∞ ≥ ε}. Obviously,




(ε) → IRL is
considered. To prove Theorem 3.1.i we take ζ̃(s, q) equal to ζ̂(s1, . . . , sLI, sLI+1p̃
II, q). The
set Z̃− = ζ̃−1(−IR
L
+) = {(s, q) ∈ S
LI × QL
II
(ε) | ζ̃(s, q) ∩ −IRL+ 6= ∅} has a very special
structure as the following result shows.
Lemma A.4
Let ε ≥ 0 and pII ∈ IRL
II
++ be given. Let ζ̃ : S
LI × QL
II
(ε) → IRL be a compact-valued,





(ε), for every z ∈ ζ̃(s, q), (s1, . . . , sLI, sLI+1p
II) · z ≤ 0, and, for l ∈ LII, ql = 0
implies zl ≥ 0. Then Z̃− has a component Z̃c− such that for every υ ∈ [ε, 1] there is














The compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences ϕ1 : Z →
SL
I
, ϕ2 : Z → SL
II−1, and ϕ3 : SL
I
× SL
II−1 × [ε, 1]→ Z are defined by




l∈LI slzl + sLI+1p
II · zII ≥
∑
l∈LI slzl + sLI+1p
II · zII, ∀s ∈ SL
I
}, z ∈ Z,
ϕ2(z) = {t ∈ SL
II−1 | t · zII ≥ t · zII, ∀t ∈ SL
II−1}, z ∈ Z,
ϕ3(s, t, λ) = ζ̃(s, λ t‖t‖∞ ), (s, t, λ) ∈ S
LI × SL
II−1 × [ε, 1].
It follows that the correspondence ϕ : Z ×SL
I
× SL





ϕ(z, s, t, λ) = ϕ3(s, t, λ)× ϕ1(z)× ϕ2(z), (z, s, t, λ) ∈ Z × SL
I
× SL
II−1 × [ε, 1],




II−1 is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the
set Fϕ = {(z, s, t, λ) ∈ Z×SL
I
×SL
II−1×[ε, 1] | (z, s, t) ∈ ϕ(z, s, t, λ)} contains a component
F cϕ such that (Z×S
LI×SL
II−1×{ε})∩F cϕ 6= ∅ and (Z×S
LI×SL
II−1×{1})∩F cϕ 6= ∅. The
connectedness of F cϕ therefore yields that, for every υ ∈ [ε, 1], (Z×S
LI×SL
II−1×{υ})∩F cϕ 6=
∅. Let some (z∗, s∗, t∗, λ∗) ∈ F cϕ be given. So,








II ·z∗II ≤ 0. Using that s∗ ∈ ϕ1(z∗) it follows by taking s
equal to the l-th, respectively (l+ 1)-th, unit vector that z∗Il ≤ 0, ∀l ∈ L
I, and pII · z∗II ≤ 0.
Suppose maxl∈LII z
∗




II · z∗II ≤ 0, there exists l′ ∈ LII with
z∗l′ < 0. From maxl∈LII z
∗
l > 0, z
∗
l′ < 0, and t
∗ ∈ ϕ2(z∗) it follows that t∗l′ = 0, implying that
z∗l′ ≥ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, maxl∈LII z
∗
l ≤ 0. We have shown that z
∗ ∈ −IRL+.
The function g : Z × SL
I
× SL




(ε) is defined by
g(z, s, t, λ) = (s, λ
t
‖t‖∞
), (z, s, t, λ) ∈ Z × SL
I
× SL
II−1 × [ε, 1],









The set Z̃c− is connected by the connectedness of F
c
ϕ and the continuity of g. For every
υ ∈ [ε, 1], there exists (zυ, sυ, tυ) ∈ Z × SL
I
× SL
II−1 such that (zυ, sυ, tυ, υ) ∈ F cϕ, so
g(zυ, sυ, tυ, υ) = (sυ, υ t‖t‖∞ ) = (s
υ, qυ) ∈ Z̃c−. Obviously, ‖q
υ‖∞ = υ. Q.E.D.
The correspondence ζ̃ has a continuum of points with a non-positive vector in its image
set. These points range from a point on the boundary of QL
II
(ε) with every component
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less than or equal to ε to a point on the boundary of QL
II
(ε) where at least one component
equals one.
We are now in a position to give a proof of Theorem 3.1.i. One of the problems we
have to deal with is the possible lack of upper hemi-continuity of ζ̂ at a point ((0, p̃II), 0).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.i




(ε)→ IRL is defined by ζ̃ε(s, q) = ζ̂(s1, . . . , sLI,
sLI+1p̃
II, q).
Let some ε > 0 be given. Notice that (s1, . . . , sLI) > 0 or sLI+1p̃




II · φ2(q) < 0. So, by Lemma A.2 it follows that ζ̃ε is compact-
valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous. Since ζ̃ε satisfies all conditions of
Lemma A.4, the set (ζ̃ε)−1(−IRL+) has a component Z̃
c
− such that for every υ ∈ [ε, 1] there
is (sυ, qυ) ∈ Z̃c− with ‖q
υ‖∞ = υ.
We show that Z̃c− = (ζ̃
ε)−1({0}). Let (s∗, q∗) ∈ Z̃c− be given. Then there is z ∈
ζ̃ε(s∗, q∗) ∩ −IRL+ = ζ̂(s
∗





II, q∗) ∩ −IRL+. Let p
∗ ∈ IRL+, y
∗f ∈ IRL
II
+ , f ∈ F,
z∗h ∈ −IRL
II
+ , h ∈ H, and w







∗), z∗h = φh2(q
∗), and w∗h = p∗ · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhπ̂f(p∗, y∗f). Then there is x∗h ∈










z. Let y∗1 be defined by y∗1 = y1 + z, and y∗f , f ∈ F \ {1}, by y∗f = yf . It remains to
be shown that y∗1 ∈ η̂f (p∗, y∗f). Since (x∗, y∗) ∈ A, it follows by the convexity of h that
x∗h ∈ δh(p∗, z∗h, w∗h), h ∈ H. Then non-satiation with respect to group II commodities and
convexity of h implies p∗ · x∗h = w∗h, h ∈ H, and therefore p∗ · z = 0. So p∗ · y∗1 = p∗ · y1.
Since there is no rationing on the demand side, it is obvious that y∗1 ∈ ŝ1(y∗f ), so it holds
that y∗1 ∈ η̂f (p∗, y∗f).
For n ∈ IN, take ε = 1
n
and denote the resulting component of (ζ̃ε)−1({0}) by Z̃c−(n).
By Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1, page 16, the sequence {Z̃c−(n)}n∈IN has a conver-
gent subsequence which we also denote by {Z̃c−(n)}n∈IN. By Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem
A.5.1.(ii), page 10, the closed limit of the sequence {Z̃c−(n)}n∈IN, denoted by
˜̃
Zc−, is con-
nected since every Z̃c−(n) is connected. Since ‖q‖∞ ≥
1
n
for every (s, q) ∈ Z̃c−(n), it holds
that the set Z̃c− =
˜̃
Zc− \ (S
LI×{0}) is connected. For every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is (sυ, qυ) ∈ Z̃c−
with ‖qυ‖∞ = υ.
Let (s, q) be an element of Z̃c−. Then there exists a sequence of points {(s
n, qn)}n∈IN such
that ‖qn‖∞ > 0, ζ̃0(sn, qn) = 0, and (sn, qn) → (s, q). We show that sLI+1 > 0. Suppose
sLI+1 = 0. Then ζ̃
0(s, q) = ζ̂((s1, . . . , sLI, 0), q), and since sl > 0 for some l ∈ L
I, it follows
by upper hemi-continuity of ζ̂ that 0 ∈ ζ̂((s1, . . . , sLI, 0), q) ⊆ ζ((s1, . . . , sLI, 0), φ1(q), φ2(q)).
This leads to a contradiction, because the non-satiation with respect to group II com-
modities implies ζ((s1, . . . , sLI , 0), φ1(q), φ2(q)) = ∅. Consequently, sLI+1 > 0, for every
24
(s, q) ∈ Z̃c−.




g(s, q) = ((
s1
sLI+1
, . . . ,
sLI
sLI+1
, p̃II), q), (s, q) ∈ Z̃c−.
If (p, q) ∈ g(Z̃c−), then there exists a sequence of points {(p
n, qn)}n∈IN such that ‖qn‖∞ > 0,
0 ∈ ζ̂(pn, qn), and (pn, qn) → (p, q), and the upper hemi-continuity of ζ̂ at such a point




−). It is immediate that Ẑ
c
0 is
connected. The set Êc is defined by Êc = ψ̂(Ẑc0). We finish the proof by showing that Ê
c
is connected and that it contains a continuum of potentially different equilibria.
By Lemma A.2 and the continuity of the functions φ1 and φ2 it follows that ψ̂ is a
compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Suppose Êc
is not connected, then there exist two disjoint, non-empty sets E1 and E2 such that E1
and E2 are both closed in Êc and E1 ∪E2 = Êc. Therefore, by the upper hemi-continuity
of ψ̂, it holds that ψ̂−1(E1) and ψ̂−1(E2) are closed in Ẑc0 . Suppose q ∈ ψ̂
−1(E1)∩ ψ̂−1(E2).
Let ξ1, ξ2 ∈ ψ̂(q) be such that ξ1 ∈ E1 and ξ2 ∈ E2. Then λξ1 + (1 − λ)ξ2 ∈ ψ̂(q),
∀λ ∈ [0, 1], since ψ̂(q) is convex, so ξ2 is an element of the component in Êc containing ξ1, a
contradiction to the construction of the setsE1 and E2. Consequently, ψ̂−1(E1)∩ψ̂−1(E2) =
∅. Moreover, ψ̂−1(E1) ∪ ψ̂−1(E2) = Ẑc0 , while both ψ̂
−1(E1) and ψ̂−1(E2) are closed in Ẑc0 .
So Ẑc0 is not connected, a contradiction. This concludes the proof that Ê
c is connected.
There is an underemployment equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ Êc such that for some
l′ ∈ LII it holds that min{−z∗hl′ | h ∈ H} = b. Let some h ∈ H be given. By A3 there is






l , ∀l ∈ L
II \ {l′}. The connectedness
of Êc implies that for every b ∈ (0, ehl′ − x
h
l′ ] there exists an underemployment equilibrium
(p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) ∈ Êc such that min{−z∗hl′ | h ∈ H} = b. Now, let x̂
h be the convex
combination of xh and eh satisfying ehl′ − x̂
h
l′ = b. Then x̂
h belongs to the budget set of
household h in the underemployment equilibrium related to b, whereas x̂h + ε(xh − eh) is
not an element of this set for every ε > 0. So, underemployment equilibria associated with
different values of b are potentially different. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.ii










is the projection of E on the coordinates corresponding to the commodities in LI∪{l′}, fixing
the other coordinates at the values of the initial endowments or at zero. So Xhl′ = IR
LI+1
+ ,
hl′ is defined by x
h hl′ x̂
h for xh, x̂h ∈ Xhl′ if x
h hl′
̂̂xh with xh = xhl , l ∈ LI ∪{l′}, ̂̂xhl = x̂hl ,
l ∈ LI ∪ {l′}, and xhl = e
h
l and
̂̂xhl = ehl otherwise, and Y fl′ = {(yf1 , . . . , yfLI, yfl′) ∈ IRLI+1 |




l′ , 0) ∈ Y
f}. For all h ∈ H, fix the initial endowments of commodities
l ∈ LII \ {l′} and denote this H(LII − 1)-dimensional vector by e(−l′). Similarly, the
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initial endowments corresponding to the commodities in LI ∪ {l′} are denoted by the
H(LI + 1)-dimensional vector e(l′). It can be shown as in Laroque (1978), Proposition 3.1,
page 1131, and Appendix, Proposition A4, page 1152, that there is a full measure subset
Ω(e(−l′)) of IRH(L
I+1)
++ such that, for every e(l
′) ∈ Ω(e(−l′)), for every competitive equi-
librium of the economy El′(e(l′), e(−l′)), there is trade in the market for every commodity
l ∈ LI ∪ {l′}. It follows by a standard argument that Ωl′, the set of initial endowments
e ∈ IRHL++ for which in every competitive equilibrium of the resulting economy El′(e) there
is non-zero trade in the market for every commodity in LI ∪ {l′}, is open. Moreover,
∪
e(−l′)∈IRH(L
II−1){(e(l′), e(−l′)) | e(l′) ∈ Ω(e(−l′))} ⊆ Ωl′. Therefore, Ωl′ is an open set of
full measure, and Ω = ∩l′∈LIIΩl′ is an open set of full measure.
Let e ∈ Ω be given and let Êc be a component of the set of underemployment equilibria
of E = ((Xh,h, eh)h∈H , (Y f , (θfh)h∈H)f∈F , p̃II, α, β) which includes an underemployment
equilibrium with maxl∈LII υl = υ for all υ ∈ (0, 1]. By Theorem 3.1.i such a component
exists.
Suppose there are not two strongly different underemployment equilibria. For every
υ ∈ (0, 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in Êc with maxl∈LII υl = υ, allocation
(x(υ), y(υ)), where xh(υ) ∼h xh(1), xh,II(υ) − eh,II ≥ φh1(q(υ)), and y
f,II(υ) ≤ φf2(q(υ)),
with ‖q(υ)‖∞ = υ. The allocation (x(0), y(0)) is defined as a limit point of the sequence
(x(1/n), y(1/n))n∈IN. It follows by market equilibrium, xh,II(υ)−eh,II ≥ φh1(q(υ)), υ ∈ (0, 1],
and yf,II(υ) ≤ φf2(q(υ)), υ ∈ (0, 1], that x
h,II(0) = eh,II and yf,II(0) = 0. By the closedness
of A it follows that (x(0), y(0)) ∈ A.









(0). Suppose, on the contrary, that xh(1) = xh(0) for all h ∈ H and
yf(1) = yf(0) for all f ∈ F. Let l′ ∈ LII be such that there is no rationing in the mar-
ket for commodity l′ in some underemployment equilibrium in Êc. Then it follows that
((pl(1))l∈LI∪{l′}, (xl(1))l∈LI∪{l′}, (yl(1))l∈LI∪{l′}) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy
El′(e). Since e ∈ Ω, there is non-zero trade in the market for commodity l′, a contradiction.














, (θfh)h∈H)f∈F ), where
X
h
= {xh ∈ Xh | xh,II − eh,II ≥ φh1(q(1))} and Y
f
= {yf ∈ Y f | yf,II ≤ φf2(q(1))}.
Clearly, (p(1), x(1), y(1)) is a competitive equilibrium for E and therefore (x(1), y(1)) is a
Pareto optimal allocation in E . However, for every λ ∈ (0, 1), (λx(0) + (1−λ)x(1), λy(0) +
(1 − λ)y(1)) is a feasible allocation (using that trivially xh,II(0) − eh,II ≥ φh1(q(1)) and
yf,II(0) ≤ φf2(q(1))) for E that satisfies λx













(1) in the interior of Y f
′
,
contradicting the Pareto optimality of the allocation (x(1), y(1)) in E . Consequently, there
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are two strongly different underemployment equilibria in Êc, and, by the connectedness of
Êc, there is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria in Êc. Q.E.D.
We generalize the assumptions of Theorem 3.1.iii. To avoid unnecessary technicalities,
we consider the case where ζ̂ is a function, denoted by ẑ. We parametrize relevant price
systems and expectations of available opportunities by means of a vector q ∈ QL. The
first LI components of q are used to parametrize the prices of the first LI commodities,
and the last LII components to parametrize the expected opportunities for the group II
commodities. Let p∗  0 be a competitive price system for the economy E. The function
p : QL→ IRL is defined by pl(q) = p
∗
l ql if l ∈ L
I, and pl(q) = p
∗
l if l ∈ L
II.
The function z : QL→ IRL is defined by
z(q) = ẑ(p(q), qII), q ∈ QL.
Notice that p(q) depends on qI only. Let BL denote the boundary of QL where all com-
ponents are positive and at least one is equal to 1, so BL = {q ∈ QL | ∃l ∈ L, ql = 1 and
q  0}. We say that z satisfies the boundary condition if
∀q ∈ BL, z(q) = 0 or ∃l′ ∈ L such that ql′ > min
l∈L
ql and zl′(q) < max
l∈L
zl(q). (2)
We prove Theorem 3.1.iii with A7 replaced by the weaker A7’ below5.
A7’. For at least one Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗) of E the function z satisfies
Condition (2).
Proof of Theorem 3.1.iii
Let some ε > 0 be given. First we show the existence of a connected set Zc− such that for




We extend z to a subset of the set R = {r ∈ IRL | ε ≤
∑
l∈L rl ≤ L}. Let ρ : R →





by minimizing the Euclidean distance to this set. Let the continuous, compact-valued




l∈L rl} and the
continuous function g : R×QL→ IR by g(r, q) = −
∑
l∈L(rl−ql)
2. Then the correspondence
that assigns to r ∈ R the set of points q ∈ ϕ(r) maximizing g(r, q) on ϕ(r) is an upper
hemi-continuous, compact-valued correspondence by the maximum theorem. Since ϕ(r)
is convex for every r ∈ R it follows that there is a unique maximizer. It is clear that
5A7 leads to the following property: ∀q ∈ BL, if ql′ = 1, then zl′(q) ≤ 0. Let some q ∈ BL be given.
If z(q) = 0, then Condition (2) is satisfied. If z(q) 6= 0, then q is not the vector of all ones. Let l′ ∈ L be
such that ql′ = 1. Then ql′ > minl∈L ql, and zl′(q) ≤ 0 < maxl∈L zl(q).
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the correspondence coincides with ρ, so ρ is a continuous function. Using the first-order
conditions it follows that if ρ(r) = q, then either
∑
l∈L rl = L and ρ(r) = 1 or
∑
l∈L rl < L
and there is λ ∈ IR, µl ≥ 0, l ∈ L, νl ≥ 0, l ∈ L, such that, for every l ∈ L, ql = rl−λ+µl−νl,
µlql = 0 and νl(ql − 1) = 0.
The set ∆ is defined by ∆ = {δ ∈ IRL |
∑
l∈L δl = 0 and δl ≥ −1, ∀l ∈ L}. Then
δ + λ1 ∈ R for every δ ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [ε, 1], with 1 the vector of all ones. The continuous
function ϕ1 : ∆× [ε, 1]→ IRL is defined by ϕ1(δ, λ) = z(ρ(δ+λ1)). Since ϕ1 is a continuous
function, the set ϕ1(∆× [ε, 1]) is compact, and therefore there exists a compact, convex set
Z satisfying ϕ1(∆×[ε, 1]) ⊆ Z. The compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence ϕ2 : Z → ∆ is defined by
ϕ2(z) =
{






δlzl, ∀δ ∈ ∆
}
, z ∈ Z.
It follows that the correspondence ϕ : Z ×∆× [ε, 1]→ Z ×∆ defined by
ϕ(z, δ, λ) = ϕ1(δ, λ)× ϕ2(z), (z, δ, λ) ∈ Z ×∆× [ε, 1],
is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence, and the
set Z × ∆ is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the set
Fϕ = {(z, δ, λ) ∈ Z × ∆ × [ε, 1] | (z, δ) ∈ ϕ(z, δ, λ)} contains a component F cϕ such that
(Z ×∆× {ε}) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅ and (Z ×∆× {1}) ∩ F
c
ϕ 6= ∅. The connectedness of F
c
ϕ therefore
yields that, for every υ ∈ [ε, 1], (Z × ∆ × {υ}) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅. Let some (z
∗, δ∗, λ∗) ∈ F cϕ be
given. So, (z∗, δ∗, λ∗) ∈ ϕ1(δ∗, λ∗)× ϕ2(z∗). Let us define q∗ = ρ(δ∗ + λ∗1) and p∗ = p(q∗).
Suppose maxl∈L z∗l > 0. There is l





Otherwise, δ∗ ∈ ϕ2(z∗) implies δ∗l = −1 for all l ∈ L with p
∗









l = 0, a contradiction. Then, since p
∗ · z∗ ≤ 0, there is l2 ∈ L
such that z∗l2 < 0 and p
∗
l2 > 0. This implies δ
∗
l2 = −1. It follows that q
∗  0, since q∗l = 0
for some l ∈ L implies that q∗l2 = 0, so l
2 ∈ LII, and z∗l2 ≥ 0, which gives a contradiction.
Without loss of generality we can assume that δ∗l1 > 0. Using that δ
∗
l1 > 0, δ
∗
l2 = −1 and
q∗  0, it follows from the first-order conditions for the projection that q∗l1 = 1. Moreover,
for every l′ ∈ L, if z∗l′ < maxl∈L z
∗
l , then δ
∗
l′ = −1, so q
∗
l′ = minl∈L q
∗
l . This contradicts A7’,
unless q∗ = 1. Consequently, q∗ = 1 or maxl∈L z∗l ≤ 0.
Since p∗ is Walrasian it holds that z(1) = 0. The function g : Z ×∆ × [ε, 1] → QL is
defined by
g(z, δ, λ) = δ + λ1, (z, δ, λ) ∈ Z ×∆× [ε, 1],




ϕ). We have shown that for every q ∈ Z
c
−, z(q) ∈
−IRL+. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1.i it follows that z(q) = 0. The set Z
c
− is connected
by the connectedness of F cϕ and the continuity of g. For every λ ∈ [ε, 1], there exists
(zλ, δλ, λ) ∈ F cϕ, so g(z






For n ∈ IN, take ε = 1
n
and denote the resulting component of {q ∈ QL |
∑
l∈L ql ≥ ε and




2) if n1 < n2. By Mas-Colell
(1985), Theorem A.5.1.(ii), page 10, the closed limit of the sequence {Zc0(n)}n∈IN, denoted
by Zc0, is connected. For every λ ∈ (0, 1] it holds that there is q





and by continuity of z at any such point, it follows that z(qλ) = 0. Moreover, since for




l = λL it holds that for every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is
qυ ∈ Zc0 with maxl∈LII q
υ
l = υ, and for every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is q̂
υ ∈ Zc0 with minl∈LII q̂
υ
l = υ.
Let the set of underemployment equilibria Êc be defined by
Êc = ψ̂({(p(q), qII) ∈ IRL+ ×Q
LII | q ∈ Z
c
0 \ {0}})
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1.i it follows that Êc is connected, whereas the properties
given above imply that for every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in Êc
with maxl∈LII υl = υ and for every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in
Êc with minl∈LII υl = υ. The set Ê
c ranges from an approximate no-trade equilibrium at
prices p ≤ p∗ to the competitive equilibrium (p∗, x∗, y∗, z∗, y∗). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
By Theorem 3.1.i, Ê has a component Êc which includes an underemployment equilibrium
with maxl∈LII υl = υ for all υ ∈ (0, 1]. If there are two different underemployment equilibria
in Êc, then there is a continuum of different underemployment equilibria in Êc by the
connectedness of Êc.
Suppose there are not two different underemployment equilibria in Êc. Then, for every
υ ∈ (0, 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in Êc with maxl∈LII υl = υ and alloca-
tion (x(υ), y(υ)), where x(υ) = x(1), xh(υ)− eh ≥ φh1(q(υ)), h ∈ H, and y
f(υ) ≤ φf2(q(υ)),
f ∈ F, with ‖q(υ)‖∞ = υ. Now, for every υ ∈ (0, 1], xh(1) − eh ≥ φh1(q(υ)), implying that















2(q(υ)), implying that x
h(1) = eh, h ∈ H, and
∑
f∈F y
f(υ) = 0, ∀υ ∈
(0, 1].
Suppose there is f ′ ∈ F such that yf
′








(1) ∈ Y, and by choosing yf
′
= 0 it follows that∑
f∈F\{f ′} y




(1) ∈ Y. So, 0 6= yf
′
(1) ∈ Y ∩ −Y ⊆ {0}, a contradiction.
Consequently, yf(1) = 0, f ∈ F.
Let l′ ∈ L be such that there is no rationing in the market for commodity l′ at the
underemployment equilibrium (p̃II, x(1), y(1), z(1), y(1)). There is h ∈ H such that eh /∈
δh(p̃II, 0−l′ , p̃II · eh) or there is f ∈ F such that 0 /∈ ηf(p̃II, 0−l′). In the latter case there is
yf ∈ sf (0−l′) such that p·yf > 0. The convex combination λyf+(1−λ)yf (1) = λyf belongs
to sf (yf (1)) for λ sufficiently small since yf
l′
(1) ≥ b, while p̃II · λyf > 0, a contradiction to
p̃II ·yf(1) = p̃II ·0 = 0. In the former case there is xh ∈ γh(p̃II, 0−l′ , p̃II ·eh) such that xh h eh.
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Since zhl′(1) ≤ −b ≤ −e
h
l′ it follows that γ
h(p̃II, 0−l′ , p̃II · eh) ⊆ γh(p̃II, zh(1), p̃II · eh) =
γh(p̃II, zh(1), p̃II · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhp̃II · yf(1)). This leads to a contradiction with xh(1) = eh.
Consequently, the hypothesis that there are not two different underemployment equilibria
in Êc is false, and there is a continuum of different underemployment equilibria in Êc.
The existence of a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria in Êc
follows immediately if there is h ∈ H such that eh /∈ δh(p̃II, 0−l′ , p̃II ·eh) since γh(p̃II, 0−l′ , p̃II ·
eh) ⊆ γh(p̃II, zh(1), p̃II · eh +
∑
f∈F θ




yf(1)) and eh ≺h xh(1). If such a household h does not exist, then by assumption there is
f ∈ F such that 0 /∈ ηf(p̃II, 0−l′). It follows that 0 /∈ ηf(p̃II, yf(1)), and πf(p̃II, yf(1)) > 0.
Let h ∈ H be such that θfh > 0. Then there is an open neighbourhood O of eh such that
p̃II · xh < p̃II · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhπf(p̃II, yf (1)), ∀xh ∈ O, and by non-satiation with respect to
group II commodities at the initial endowment there is xh ∈ O ∩ X̂h such that eh < xh
and eh ≺h xh. Clearly, xh ∈ γh(p̃II, zh(1), p̃II · eh +
∑
f∈F θ
fhπf(p̃II, yf (1))), so xh(1)  eh,
and it follows that there is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria.
Q.E.D.
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